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Foreword
Statements of Tax Policy represent a conscientious effort by the 
federal tax division of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants to explore, comment, and, where appropriate, de­
velop positions on, matters of tax policy covering major areas of 
taxation in which members of the accounting profession have 
special competence.
Reform of the present system of estate and gift taxation has 
been under serious consideration for a number of years, with 
proposals for change coming from many sources, including Con­
gress, the Treasury Department, and a number of professional 
organizations. The federal tax division has also been actively ad­
vocating changes in this area, and its ideas and proposals are 
summarized in this statement. It is intended that the formal 
presentation of this study will assist members of the congressional 
tax writing committees, members of the executive branch of gov­
ernment, and the public in their consideration of this subject.
Statements of Tax Policy are approved by the executive com­
mittee of the federal tax division after they are developed by the 
division’s tax policy subcommittee. Other division subcommittees 
may develop a policy statement if requested to do so. This state­
ment was developed by the 1972-73 financial and estate plan­
ning subcommittee and approved by the 1973-74 executive com­
mittee.
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1Synopsis of AICPA Position
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants sup­
ports estate and gift tax reform legislation in the following key 
areas.
Generation-Skipping Transfers
Under current law, an individual can make a transfer of prop­
erty to a descendant two generations removed and, so long as 
intervening generations are limited to a mere economic interest 
(that is, an income interest), no estate or gift tax is imposed on 
the intervening generation. We recommend the following:
• No imposition of tax on outright transfers benefitting a 
“skipped” generation.
• Imposition of a tax on creation of inter vivos and testamen­
tary trusts which benefit a skipped generation.
• Basing such tax on actuarially determined values.
• Imposing such tax on the estate of the skipped generation 
and making it payable from trust corpus.
• A liberal disclaimer provision and extension of the previous­
ly taxed property tax credit for a period of up to twenty-five 
years.
The Marital Deduction
Under present law a decedent may transfer up to one half of 
his estate to his spouse free of tax so long as the interest trans­
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ferred does not lapse because of the passage of time or occur­
rence of certain events ( “terminable interest rule”). We recom­
mend the following:
• Retention of the 50 percent marital deduction limitation.
• Retention of the terminable interest rule.
• As stated below, an exemption level of $150,000, which 
would permit a $300,000 estate to pass free of tax.
Appreciated Assets Transferred at Death
At present, when a decedent owning appreciated assets dies, 
the appreciation is not subject to the income tax, and the benefi­
ciaries take a basis in the property received equal to its fair 
market value. We recommend retention of our present system in 
this area.
Unified Transfer Tax
There currently exists an exemption from the estate tax of 
$60,000, and a lifetime gift tax exemption of $30,000 per donor. 
In addition, there is an annual exclusion of $3,000 for each donee 
for gifts of present interests. We recommend the following:
• Unification of these two systems of transfer taxes.
• Retention of the present estate and gift tax rates.
• That upon death, there be included in the estate tax compu­
tation 75 percent of the fair market value of inter vivos gifts 
made.
• Allowance of a credit for gift taxes paid on inter vivos gifts.
• Retention of the $3,000 annual gift tax exclusion.
• Increasing to $150,000 the current combined $90,000 exemp­
tion for estate and gift taxes.
Liberalization of Deferred Payment of Federal Estate Tax
Under present law, an extension of time to pay the federal 
estate tax may be granted in two situations: (1) where payment 
of the tax would result in “undue hardship” to the estate (Sec­
tion 6161) and (2) where the estate consists largely of an inter­
est in a closely held business ( Section 6166). In addition, Section
2
303 permits certain redemption distributions to be made to help 
in paying the estate tax, without certain adverse income tax 
consequences. We recommend the following:
• Treatment as a single corporation, for both Sections 303 and 
6166 purposes, a decedent’s interest in two or more corpora­
tions if the estate owns more than 50 percent of each,
• No change in the amount of redemption proceeds qualifying 
under Section 303.
• Liberalization of ownership requirements in connection with 
the payment of estate taxes where an estate consists largely 
of an interest in a closely held business.
• Liberalization of Section 6161 with regard to extensions of 
time for payment of the tax.
3
2Generation-Skipping Transfers
Background
Under current law, a person may transfer property by gift or 
bequest to a lineal descendent more than one generation re­
moved from himself (for example, a grandchild), and, as a re­
sult, the transfer tax is not paid by the intervening generation. In 
addition to outright transfers, a settlor may make a taxable trans­
fer of property and not have the property subject to transfer tax 
again for several generations with the use of trust instruments 
which satisfy the rule against perpetuities. This is true although 
some elements of beneficial enjoyment of the property accrue to 
the intervening ( or “skipped”) generations.
Discussion
The U.S. Treasury Department Tax Reform  Studies and Pro­
posals dated February 5, 1969,1 pertaining to estate tax, recom­
mended a tax upon generation-skipping transfers. It was pro­
posed to levy a “substitute” tax, in addition to the present trans­
fer taxes, if property is transferred to a grandchild or more re-
1 U.S. Treasury Department, “Tax Reform Studies and Proposals,” A Trea­
sury Tax Study (Washington, D.C., Feb. 5, 1969), hereinafter referred to 
as 1969 Treasury Proposals. All subsequent direct citations of this report 
will be indicated by page number within the body of the text.
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mote generation. This tax upon generation-skipping (G ST) would 
apply to outright transfers as well as transfers in trust. The tax 
would be 60 percent of the basic transfer tax, unless the member 
of the skipped generation elected to treat the transfer as a gift 
or bequest to him and a simultaneous gift to the next generation.
Position of Other Professional Groups
On April 30, 1968, the American Law Institute (A LI) issued 
a report entitled Federal Estate and G ift Tax Project.2 It was 
therein reported that the Council to the Members of the ALI 
approved a resolution to recommend a GST only upon a very 
limited class of transfers. Basically, the ALI proposal was to have 
a GST only upon transfers in trust that would vest in a younger 
generation at a time subsequent to the time of death of the im­
mediately succeeding generation. In other words, if the trust 
provided for income for benefit of a child and the remainder to a 
grandchild upon the death of the child, there would be no ad­
ditional tax. If, however, the trust continued after the death of 
the child with the remainder to a great-grandchild upon the 
grandchild’s death, there would be an additional tax.
The American Bankers Association (ABA) would also limit 
the GST solely to transfers in trust. The ABA, in general, would 
impose a GST only if the transfer skips more than one genera­
tion.
AICPA Proposals
The AICPA’s position is that there should be a tax upon trans­
fers in trust that skip a generation; the Institute favors a limited 
inclusion in the estate of the member of the skipped generation, 
provided such person had a beneficial interest in the trust. The 
AICPA, therefore, makes the following proposals.
No Separate Generation-Skipping Tax on Testator or Settlor. 
To the extent that there would be a tax on the property passing 
to a grandchild or later generation, such tax would be computed
2 Published as Federal Estate and Gift Taxation: Recommendations Adopted 
by the American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 23-4, 1968.
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by including a value in the gross estate of the skipped person. 
The tax would be due at the time that person's estate tax is due. 
Thus, no additional tax would be due from the settlor of an inter 
vivos gift in trust nor from the estate of the creator of a testa­
mentary trust. The tax would be payable from the corpus of the 
trust. If a generation obtains its interest in the trust or the prop­
erty in a manner other than by death of the skipped generation 
(such as after a certain term), the tax would be payable at the 
time of transfer of interest as though the generation whose in­
terest had terminated had made a gift.
No Additional Tax on Outright Gifts or Bequests. Only gifts 
in trust would be included in the gross estate of the skipped per­
son. Also, only to the extent that the skipped person had a bene­
ficial interest would there be an inclusion.
Inclusion in Gross Estate Based Upon Actuarial Values. If a 
person’s beneficial interest in a trust expires and if a more remote 
generation from the grantor than such person will obtain an in­
terest (for example, if the son of a grantor dies and the corpus 
goes to the grantor’s grandchild), then a computation would be 
made of an amount to be included in the estate ( or taxable gifts) 
of such a person. The fair market value of the corpus at the date 
of such termination would be calculated. A pro rata portion of 
this fair market value would be included in the calculation of 
his gift tax. The portion included would be based upon an ac­
tuarial computation of the interest so terminated. This computa­
tion would be made as of the date the trust is created ( or at the 
date it became irrevocable if this is later). If the decedent was 
solely an income beneficiary, the actuarial value would be based 
upon present value tables of a life-income interest using the age 
of the beneficiary as of the date of the commencement of his in­
come interest in the trust. If his interest was only for a term of 
years, then the calculation would be based upon that period. The 
AICPA believes, however, that the present 6 percent table is too 
high for this purpose. A table based upon a 4.5 percent or 5 per­
cent return would appear to be more equitable.
Exam ple—Assume that a father dies at a time when his son is 
age forty-five. Father leaves $1 million in trust with income to his 
son, and upon the son’s death, the remainder to his grandchil­
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dren. When the son dies, the corpus has a fair market value of 
$2 million. The present value at 5 percent of the right to use 
$1 for the life of a forty-five-year-old person is about 62 per­
cent. Thus, 62 percent of the $2 million date-of-death value 
would be subject to estate tax upon the death of the life benefi­
ciary. The amount subject to tax would be limited to the interest 
passing to the next generation. The estate tax would be paid out 
of the trust corpus unless the life beneficiary provided by will or 
otherwise that the tax should come from his estate.
The tax charged to the corpus would be from the top brackets. 
Thus, the personal estate of the life beneficiary would not be af­
fected by the inclusion of the life interest in the tax computation.
W ith Sprinkling Trust, Taxation o f Corpus Upon D eath o f Last 
Beneficiary to Die. The question arises as to the best method of 
taxing the corpus when the income may be paid to any member 
of a class that includes more than one member of the skipped 
generation through the use of a sprinkling trust. The AICPA 
recognizes that arguments could be made for taxing a portion of 
the corpus as each beneficiary dies or when the last member dies, 
basing the tax in either case upon the rates applicable as if the 
pro rata part had been included in each beneficiary’s estate at the 
time he died. Yet again, arguments could be made for granting 
various elections to the trustee. Each of these various approaches 
has certain advantages. They all, however, lack the characteris­
tics of simplicity and ease of administration. Because it would 
work without putting an unreasonable burden upon the IRS or 
the trustees, the AICPA has determined that the best approach 
would be to tax the corpus upon the death of the last beneficiary 
to die, based upon the facts applicable to such last member of 
the generation. Thus, if the last to die had an actuarial interest of 
60 percent, that percentage of the fair market value of the corpus 
on the date of his death would be included and taxed in his 
estate.
In this regard, it is important to note the need for the enact­
ment of a very liberal disclaimer provision. The AICPA recom­
mends that the Internal Revenue Code provide that a beneficiary 
may be permitted to waive his income rights at any time within 
a two-year period commencing with the date of death of the 
testator or with the date that an inter vivos trust is created. Such
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a disclaimer would result in no tax. There would be tax neither 
at the date of disclaimer nor at the date of the beneficiary’s 
subsequent death. Thus, the possibility is reduced that the corpus 
would be taxed at rates applicable to the wealthiest members of 
the generation.
W ith Power to Invade the Corpus, Taxation o f Corpus Based  
on Value at Tim e of Beneficiary’s Death. The trustee may have 
the power to invade the corpus for the benefit of a member of the 
skipped generation, or the beneficiary may have the power to de­
mand the corpus. If the beneficiary does not disclaim his right to 
receive the corpus pursuant to such power, the AICPA would 
have the tax on the corpus based upon values at the time of his 
death. There would not be any reduction based upon actuarial 
computations unless the invasion power is less than complete. 
Thus, assuming that a person has a limited power to request cor­
pus ( for example, a right to $5,000 or 5 percent of the corpus per 
year), the value of such right would be included in his estate tax 
computation. If, therefore, a forty-five-year-old person received a 
life interest and a “5-and-5” power, the AICPA would actuarially 
compute the value of the power plus the value of an income in­
terest upon the remaining corpus. The tax on this amount would 
be based upon fair market values at the time of his death. If he 
actually draws down corpus each year, the AICPA would not 
have the remaining corpus subjected to a tax based upon this 
power. If the power is partially used, the computed amount 
would be reduced by the amount previously withdrawn.
Even in a case where there is more than one member of the 
generation for whom there can be an invasion, the AICPA would 
not recommend a tax until the last member dies. At such time, 
the full fair market value would be included and taxed in such 
last person’s estate. In other words, the facts and circumstances 
applicable to the last surviving member would be used for the 
tax computation. An obvious exception would be those cases 
where a portion of the trust’s corpus terminates as each skipped 
person dies. In such a case, there would be a tax on such a por­
tion at the time of termination.
More L iberal Credits for Tax Paid on Prior Transfers. An in­
justice can occur if the skipped person dies shortly after the trust
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is created. The severity of this problem can be greatly reduced, 
however, by the AICPA proposal for more liberal credits for tax 
paid on prior transfers. For this purpose, a liberal credit would 
be allowed not only for estate tax on prior transfers, but also for 
gift tax paid in the case of an inter vivos trust. (This logically 
follows as a result of the proposed integration of the gift and 
estate taxes.)
W ith Two Skipped Generations, Taxation Based Upon Actu­
arial Computations. There would be a tax upon the death of 
each skipped generation based upon actuarial computations. The 
actuarial interest of a child who had an income interest would 
be taxed upon his death. The actuarial interest of a member of 
the next, skipped, generation would be taxed upon that member’s 
death. Assuming, for example, a life income to a son and then to 
a grandson with remainder to great grandchildren, the tax upon 
the death of the son would be as described above. The tax upon 
death of the grandchild would be based upon his age at the time 
his income interest vested (that is, at the death of the son). If 
the grandchild should predecease the son, there would be no 
tax upon the grandchild’s death. If the grandchild dies shortly 
after the son, there would be a liberal credit for the tax paid 
upon the son’s death.
Extension o f Availability o f Previously Taxed Property Credit. 
Under present law, if a gross estate includes property recently 
inherited from a prior decedent and the prior decedent’s estate 
paid a tax with respect to the property, a credit is available to 
the second estate. A full credit is available if less than two years 
has elapsed between the two deaths. The credit is reduced by 
20 percent every two years, until no credit is available if the 
second death occurs more than ten years after the first.
Estate and gift tax reforms have been proposed that will gen­
erate additional tax revenue. The generation-skipping proposals, 
in particular, can result in a tax for each generation rather than 
for every second or third generation, as is presently the case with 
large accumulations of wealth. Because of the greater and more 
frequent incidence of tax, the AICPA has concluded that the pre­
viously taxed property credit should be available for a longer 
period of time than the present ten years.
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The AICPA favors extending the availability of the previously 
taxed property credit. For the first five years after death a 100 
percent credit for prior estate taxes would be granted. The per­
centage of the credit available would be reduced by 5 percent 
per year thereafter. When a period of twenty-five years has 
elapsed, no credit would be available.
Exam ple—Assume that A dies in 1974 leaving his entire estate 
to B, and B dies in 1978. B’s estate will have an available credit 
equal to the entire estate tax paid by the estate of A.
If B dies in 1984, ten years after A dies, the credit would be 
reduced to 75 percent of the taxes paid by A’s estate, that is, 100 
percent less 25 percent (five years at 5 percent). If B dies after 
1999, no credit from A’s estate would be available.
The period of twenty-five years was selected as representative 
of a customary period between generations. The gradual reduc­
tion in credit between five and twenty-five years was considered 
to be logical inasmuch as the second decedent would have en­
joyed the inherited assets for some period of time. The transfer 
at his death should, therefore, be at least partially taxed.
This liberalization becomes logical if generation skipping is 
adopted. If a member of a skipped generation dies prior to his 
actuarial expectancy, his estate, under the AICPA proposals, 
must nevertheless include an actuarially computed amount. The 
liberalized credit results in fairer treatment in such cases of pre­
mature death.
Summary
The AICPA is opposed to a tax upon outright generation-skip­
ping transfers because the member of the skipped generation has 
no economic interest in the property. Further, the AICPA finds 
nothing socially or economically wrong with gifts or bequests that 
totally skip a generation. If a person has an economic interest, 
that interest should be subject to a tax at the time the interest 
terminates. The tax should be measured by the value of the per­
son’s estate as well as the value of the interest. An additional tax 
on the original settlor or on his estate is unfavorable, since this 
would cause an incorrect timing of the tax. Nor should taxpayers 
be required to make an election as to when the tax is payable or 
as to when the trust property should be valued. The AICPA is
11
opposed to the IRS proposals because it does not believe that a 
new tax should be enacted. Rather, it is thought that the situa­
tion can be corrected by redefining the criteria that will result in 
inclusions in a gross estate or in taxable gifts. The IRS proposals 
may result in excessive complexity, lack of relationship of the 
tax to the economic interest subject to tax, and incorrect timing 
of the tax.
There are many situations not covered in this presentation. 
Only a basic concept necessary to solve a basic problem has been 
set forth. This basic problem is that, at present, a generation may 
have the benefit of corpus which is not subject to transfer tax 
when it is passed on to the next generation. To subject such 
corpus fully to tax when the generation has only a limited interest 
is, in the opinion of the AICPA, inappropriate. The foregoing 
proposals attempt to find a fair and equitable solution to a very 
real problem.
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3The Marital Deduction
Background
Current law allows a deduction to a donor or decedent for part 
of the value of property transferred to a spouse. Such a deduc­
tion, referred to as the “marital deduction,” is limited in the case 
of a gift to one-half of the value of the gift and in the case of 
an estate to one-half of the “adjusted gross estate.” As a result of 
the marital deduction, an individual may transfer one-half of his 
separate property to his spouse, tax free.
To qualify for the marital deduction, outright ownership of the 
property transferred generally must pass to the spouse so that, un­
less it is consumed or again given away, it will eventually be in­
cluded in the estate of the surviving spouse. Such provision is re­
ferred to as the “terminable interest rule.”
Discussion
Many practitioners and professional groups believe that the 
present structure of the marital deduction works a hardship on 
small to moderate-sized estates, especially those estates where all 
the assets are bequeathed to a widow who must provide for her­
self and her children. Treasury Department studies indicate that, 
on the average, a widow survives her husband by ten years, and 
it is felt that when property passes to a widow, a tax imposes a 
difficult burden at a time when other significant income sources 
often disappear.
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w hile it is generally agreed that adequate protection for 
widows and a reduction in estate tax on moderate estates is a 
necessary part of estate tax reform, there does not appear to be 
any reason for the deferral of estate taxes when property trans­
ferred to a surviving spouse is more than sufficient to satisfy her 
needs. An unlimited marital deduction, advocated by some 
groups, goes far beyond the objective of providing relief to a sur­
viving spouse and would be of greater benefit to larger estates 
than smaller estates.
Studies indicate that the adoption of an unlimited marital 
deduction would result in a permanent reduction of 7 percent of 
the revenue from federal estate and gift taxes and an immediate 
revenue loss of as high as 17 percent since there would be a tax 
deferral until such time as the surviving spouse dies. Most of the 
other estate and gift tax reform proposals would result in an in­
crease in revenue. Accordingly, a retention of the existing 50 per­
cent marital deduction (with a modification for modest estates) 
would allow for an adjustment in the rate structure and exemp­
tion level which would not be dependent on the enactment of a 
provision for taxing appreciation at death.
An unlimited marital deduction would tend to distort proper 
estate planning. In order to minimize the tax on the first to die, 
there would be a tendency to transfer all of the property to the 
surviving spouse. In estates of any substance, the transfer of all 
property to a surviving spouse, particularly when there are chil­
dren, should not be encouraged. Under an unlimited marital de­
duction, deferral possibilities resulting from remarriages can be 
carried to ludicrous extremes.
Adoption of an unlimited marital deduction appears to make 
the adoption of a beneficial enjoyment theory essential. Under an 
unlimited marital deduction, the beneficial enjoyment test would 
be the only means available for a decedent to have control over 
the ultimate disposition of property and yet for such property to 
qualify for the marital deduction. Such a provision would be a 
necessity where there are children involved or in situations of 
second marriages where the tax deferral opportunity under an 
unlimited marital deduction would encourage outright transfers 
of all property to surviving spouses.
While the adoption of a beneficial enjoyment rule would allow 
a decedent to qualify property for the marital deduction and still
14
retain control over its ultimate disposition, it would appear that 
an unlimited marital deduction would still tend to encourage the 
transfer of all property to a surviving spouse.
Position of Other Professional Groups
In their studies for estate and gift tax reform, the U.S. Trea­
sury Department, the American Law Institute, and the American 
Bankers Association all propose liberalization of the current mar­
ital deduction with respect to both the amount of the deduction 
and the type of interest which will qualify.
Recommendations of the Treasury and of the ALI propose that 
the present 50 percent marital deduction be removed entirely 
and replaced by an unlimited 100 percent marital deduction. The 
ABA favors a retention of the existing 50 percent marital deduc­
tion, coupled with a deduction for the first $250,000 of property 
transferred to the surviving spouse regardless of the 50 percent 
limitation.
With respect to the type of interest which will qualify for the 
marital deduction, the Treasury, the ALI, and the ABA, in gen­
eral agree that the present terminable interest rule should be 
eliminated and replaced by a concept referred to as the “current 
beneficial enjoyment rule,” whereby a mere income interest to 
the surviving spouse may qualify for the marital deduction. Un­
der the current beneficial enjoyment rule, an interest will qualify 
for the marital deduction whether or not the surviving spouse 
controls the underlying property, as long as it is agreed that the 
property will be taxed at the death of the spouse.
AICPA Proposals
Retention o f the 50 Percent Marital Deduction. The AICPA 
believes that the current incidence of gift and estate taxation im­
poses a disproportionate burden on small and medium-sized 
estates. The AICPA’s unified transfer tax proposal recommends 
an exemption level of $150,000. Assuming an exemption level of 
$150,000, it is felt that a 50 percent marital deduction will pro­
vide adequate relief for a surviving spouse in moderate-sized 
estates. Accordingly, the AICPA recommends a retention of the 
50 percent marital deduction as currently provided in IRC Sec. 
2056.
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Retention o f the Existing Term inable Interest Rules. The 
AICPA also recommends a retention of the existing terminable 
interest rules. Advocates of change in the existing terminable in­
terest rule point to the complex and technical requirements neces­
sary for an interest other than outright ownership to qualify for 
the marital deduction. The existing terminable interest rule has 
resulted in an inequity for those unaware of its restrictive pro­
visions. To replace such rule with a beneficial enjoyment theory 
would likewise cause inequity to the unwary. While a beneficial 
enjoyment rule would allow for greater flexibility in estate plan­
ning, introduction into the Internal Revenue Code of an entirely 
new concept permitting a mere income interest to qualify for the 
marital deduction would add additional complexity to the law 
probably causing considerable new litigation.
Summary
The AICPA is opposed to a change in the federal estate and 
gift tax laws that would permit an unlimited marital deduction 
and the addition of a beneficial enjoyment rule. While estate tax 
reform should provide adequate protection to a surviving spouse 
in moderate estates, the AICPA feels that the increase in the ex­
isting exemption level to $150,000 from $60,000, along with re­
tention of the existing marital deduction and terminable interest 
rules, will accomplish such a result. A change to an unlimited 
marital deduction and a beneficial enjoyment concept would be 
of greater benefit to larger estates, resulting in substantial rev­
enue loss and adding further complexity to the existing tax laws.
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4Appreciated Assets 
Transferred at Death
Background
Under current law, the federal estate tax is imposed upon the 
fair market value of assets includable in the decedent’s gross 
estate determined at the date of death or alternate valuation date 
(after taking into account allowable deductions and credits). The 
basis of the property in the hands of the recipient beneficiaries 
then generally becomes its value for estate tax purposes. If, how­
ever, the property represents the right to “income in respect of a 
decedent”—such as wages receivable after death, or obligations 
derived from a sale reported by the decedent under the install­
ment method—the beneficiary must carry over the decedent’s 
basis, if any.
Asset appreciation is not subject to income tax, although it is 
included in the post-death basis of the asset, under the general 
rule stated above. Appreciated property transferred by inter 
vivos gift normally retains the same basis in the hands of the 
donee as it had in the hands of the donor, plus gift tax paid on 
the full value of the transfer.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals contended that the current law 
permits vast portions of capital gains to escape income taxation. 
It charged that the law fails to recognize the separate characters
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of estate and income taxation. It further claimed that accumula­
tions derived from appreciation are favored over accumulations 
from annually assessed dividends, interest, and wages. In addi­
tion, the Treasury Department also stated that “unnatural hold­
ing patterns” develop because older investors become locked into 
appreciated assets to avoid paying income taxes on recognized 
gains. The Treasury Department drew up statistical tables based 
upon data gleaned from returns of the 1960’s and concluded that 
$15 billion a year of capital gains fall outside the income tax sys­
tem.
Under the 1969 Treasury Proposals’ capital gain tax concept, 
the appreciation on capital assets held at death would be taxed 
in the final income tax return of the decedent as if the assets had 
been held for more than six months and sold just prior to death. 
“Income in respect of a decedent” would no longer be taxed as 
the income is received. It too would be “bunched” into the de­
cedent’s final return and taxed as capital gain or ordinary income, 
depending upon its nature. Only appreciation that accumulates 
after enactment of the proposals would be subject to the tax. 
Thus, the provisions would not have retroactive effect, but estab­
lishing valuations on the enactment date would be necessary.
The income tax attributable to such capital gains and “income 
in respect of a decedent” would be deductible from the gross 
estate of the decedent and would reduce the taxable estate and, 
accordingly, reduce the estate tax (if any) otherwise payable. 
The taxed property would acquire a stepped-up basis in the 
hands of the beneficiaries as under current law.
Property transferred to a surviving spouse and to charity would 
be exempted from the tax. The decedent’s basis for the property 
would carry over to the spouse. Every decedent would have a 
minimum basis entitlement of $60,000 to preclude taxation below 
that level. All losses on capital assets held at death would be con­
sidered long-term and applied against capital gains in the year 
of death; then, under special rules, applied in the following or­
der: against capital gains in the three prior years; against or­
dinary income for the year of death; and, lastly, against ordinary 
income of the three prior years. When losses are carried back, 
they would be applied first to the most recent preceding year. 
Only 50 percent of the capital loss would be deductible when
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applied against ordinary income. Any losses not applied during 
the four-year period would expire unused.
Under the 1969 Treasury Proposals, since appreciation on prop­
erty passing to widows and charity—and to a limited extent, to 
orphans—would not be taxed, the basis would be allocated arith­
metically among the assets other than cash, in proportion to their 
respective fair market values. The objective of this rule would be 
to discourage transfers to particular beneficiaries principally to 
accomplish tax objectives.
Income taxes generated by the foregoing proposals would be 
payable, along with the estate tax, under broadened tax deferral 
provisions. The 1969 Treasury Proposals also held out the pros­
pect of lowering transfer taxes to the extent that revenues are 
expected to be produced by this new capital gains tax.
Discussion
Some insight into the rationale underlying the 1969 Treasury 
Proposals can be gained by reflecting upon certain statements 
contained therein, and upon a lecture given by their chief ad­
vocate, Professor Stanley S. Surrey. The proposals assert: “For 
administrative reasons the tax system does not every year make 
the taxpayer [whose assets have appreciated] calculate how much 
his holdings have appreciated in value.” (P. 332; emphasis and 
bracketed matter supplied.) Professor Surrey elaborated upon 
this theme during his portion of the Third Hess Memorial Lec­
ture delivered to the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York on November 18, 1971. Among other things, he stated:
We could, and probably in equity we should, tax gains as they 
accrue currently year by year. But, we don’t and the income 
tax system stays its hand as the asset increases in value, partly 
for administrative reasons and partly for policy reasons, such as, 
for example, that money may not be at hand to pay the tax.1
1 Richard B. Covey, Stanley S. Surrey, David B. Westfall, “Perspectives on 
Suggested Revisions in Federal Estate and Gift Taxation,” in The Record 
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Vol. 28, no. 1 
(1973), p. 49. All subsequent citations of this article will be made by 
page number within the body of the text.
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This argument could lead to the conclusion that if the admin­
istrative procedures could be made somewhat easier, then noth­
ing would stand in the way of a periodic, perhaps year-by-year, 
tax on unrealized appreciation. Another factor is the philosophical 
view of the economist Gardiner Ackley, which was quoted with 
apparent approval by Professor Surrey during the Hess Lecture 
and introduced by his comment that these words do not come 
from a radical economist:
In my judgment the time has now come to move steadily and 
rapidly toward the virtual abolition of the unequal start in eco­
nomic life that accrues to one who is born rich. . . .
The vehicle is at hand to do this in the radical revision of our 
estate and gift tax laws. I should hope that within a decade or 
two we could place a virtual ceiling on the transmission of more 
than the most minimal property income from members of one 
generation to members of the next. (pp. 45-6)
If one starts with a predilection for the income taxation of un­
realized gains and is inclined to seek the eradication of disparities 
of wealth, these factors would tend to support a tax system con­
taining the technical complexities and burdens inherent in the 
capital gain tax proposals. While this report does not take a posi­
tion with respect to such goals, the AICPA feels however, that 
Congress ought to be fully aware that they may be the spring­
board of the 1969 Treasury Proposals.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals place great weight on statistics 
to stimulate Congress to action. It should also be noted, however, 
that the Treasury Department drafted the proposals in the con­
text of an active stock market and used examples of investors 
who experienced 50 percent appreciation in one year. Shortly 
after the proposals were issued, the stock market began a pre­
cipitous plunge. More recent statistics indicate the probability 
that severe inequities could result from the arbitrary taxation of 
appreciation at a date prior to the realization of capital gains.
While those in favor of a tax on appreciation at death often 
argue that it eliminates the lock-in problem, changing economic 
conditions are a far stronger force to that end. We have recently
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witnessed significant changes in investment philosophies, and 
traditional practices of indefinitely holding on to “blue chip” in­
vestments are now being challenged. Untouched investments in 
many basic industries—rails, automobiles, chemicals, basic metals, 
electronics, and so forth—over extended periods of time would 
have produced little gain and some notable financial disasters. 
Tomorrow’s “blue chip” investments will be different from to­
day’s, and the elemental urge to preserve capital will dictate 
changes in security portfolios.
There is one type of investment, however, where a tax on ap­
preciation is certain to forcibly unlock long-standing ownerships 
—small businesses. The problem here is that the unlocking pro­
cess may be ruinous. The prospect of the conjunction of income 
and estate taxes on the value of the business would probably ac­
celerate the trend to merge or sell out to avert forced sales when 
the owners of closely-held companies die. This consequence 
should not be overlooked by Congress when it considers the ad­
visability of imposing a capital gain tax on appreciation.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals repeatedly refer to the advan­
tages held by a taxpayer who accumulates wealth through un­
taxed appreciation of his capital assets over one who earns or­
dinary income. While there is no doubt that one who is subject 
annually to a tax upon his ordinary income is at a comparative 
disadvantage, that disadvantage exists whether or not the investor 
is taxed on his capital gains, because the capital gain tax applies 
only when the investor chooses to realize the gain, and the tax is 
at lower effective rates. Probity dictates that the effects of cur­
rent law be evaluated by comparing persons who are similarly 
situated to measure fairly the advantages that one may have over 
the other.
The two exhibits that follow contradict the implications of 
the 1969 Treasury Proposals that the current law permits high- 
bracket taxpayers to elude paying their fair share of taxes forever. 
They disclose that the estate tax, assuming other proposals in this 
report for a unitary tax structure and for the prevention of gen­
eration skipping are enacted, effectively balances the tax impact 
in the two situations.
Exhibit 1, page 22, compares two taxpayers, A-1 and B-1. At the
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beginning of a 20-year period ended by their deaths, both held $2 
million worth of capital assets. During the 20 years, the assets ap­
preciate 30 percent (compounded) every five years. A-1 sells his 
property at five-year intervals and pays the capital gain taxes. 
When he died, the last five years of appreciation remained un­
taxed. B-1 does not sell any appreciated assets, so that the appre­
ciation arrives unreduced by income taxes into his estate. The 
Treasury Department’s commentary indicates that, under current 
law, B-1 has enormous advantages over A-1, but it disregards the 
effects of the estate tax in this situation. For example, the Trea­
sury Department states: “The estate tax will fall on both [A-1
EXHIBIT 1
Assets
Taxes
Paid
Taxpayer A-1 (000 Omitted)
Cost basis $2,000
Appreciation—first 5 years—30% 
Tax-35%
$600
210 390 $ 210
$2,390
Appreciation—second 5 years—30% 
Tax-35%
$717
251 466 251
$2,856
Appreciation—third 5 years—30% 
Tax-35%
$857
300 557 300
$3,413
Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30% 
Not taxed, taxpayer dies 1,024
$4,437
Federal gross estate tax 2,076 2,076
$2,361 $2,837
Ratios of assets and taxes paid to
combined amount 45% 55%
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EXHIBIT 1 continued
Taxpayer B-1 
Cost basis
Appreciation—first 5 years—30%
Taxes 
Assets Paid
(000 Omitted)
$2,000
600
Appreciation—second 5 years—30%
$2,600
780
Appreciation—third 5 years—30%
$3,380
1,014
Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30%
$4,394
1,318
Federal gross estate tax
$5,712
2,905
$2,807 $2,905
Ratios of assets and taxes paid to 
combined amount 49% 51%
and B-1] so it is not relevant to say that [B-1] ought not to pay 
any income tax on his accumulation of wealth ‘because he pays 
an estate tax.’ ” ( P. 332; emphasis and bracketed matter added. ) 
In Exhibit 1, A-1, the repeatedly taxed investor would have 
paid or had paid by his estate cumulative taxes of $2,837,000. 
B-1, who avoided the capital gain tax would have paid federal 
estate taxes aggregating $2,905,000—$68,000 more than A-1.
Exhibit 2 employs the same assumptions with respect to sales 
and growth rates, except that taxpayers A-2 and B-2 each held 
$4 million worth of capital assets at the beginning of a 20-year 
period ending with their deaths, B-2, who deferred payment 
of tax until his death and thereby obtained a stepped-up 
basis free of income taxes, would have paid taxes aggregating
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$7,138,000, or $429,000 more than the cumulative taxes paid by 
A-2. The taxable estates of A-1 and A-2 would have been re­
duced, of course, by both the taxes paid and the appreciation on 
the tax money no longer available for investment. The higher 
estate tax brackets reached by B-1 and B-2 brings the percentage 
of assets of the four estates paid into the federal treasury into 
comparable alignment. The computations for these two exhibits 
are as follows.
Exhibits 1 and 2 assume that the taxpayer is not married at 
date of death and is therefore unable to utilize the marital de­
duction. In the following two supplementary illustrations, the 
facts are identical except that the taxpayer takes advantage.
EXHIBIT 2
Taxes
Assets Paid
Taxpayer A-2 (000 Omitted)
Cost basis $ 4,000
Appreciation—first 5 years—30% 
Tax-35%
$1,200
420 780 $ 420
$ 4,780
Appreciation—second 5 years—30% 
Tax-35%
$1,434
502 932 502
$ 5,712
Appreciation—third 5 years—30% 
Tax-35%
$1,714
600 1,114 600
$ 6,826
Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30% 
Not taxed, taxpayer dies 2,048
$ 8,874
Federal gross estate tax 5,187 5,187
$ 3,687 $6,709
Ratios of assets and taxes paid to
combined amount 35% 65%
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Taxes 
Assets Paid
EXHIBIT 2 continued
Taxpayer B-2 
Cost basis
Appreciation—first 5 years—30% 
Appreciation—second 5 years—30% 
Appreciation—third 5 years—30% 
Appreciation—fourth 5 years—30%
(000 Omitted)
$ 4,000 
1,200
$ 5,200 
1,560
$ 6,760 
2,028
$ 8,788 
2,636
Federal gross estate tax
$11,424
7,138
$ 4,286 $7,138
Ratios of assets and taxes paid 
combined amount
to
38% 62%
EXHIBIT 3
Assets
Taxes
Paid
Taxpayer A-1 and Spouse (000 Omitted)
At time of death 
Marital
$4,437
(2,218) $2,218
$ 761
Federal gross estate tax
2,219
831
2,218
830 1,661
1,388 $1,388 $2,422
1,388
Assets transferred $2,776
Assets transferred versus 
taxes paid 53% 47%
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EXHIBIT 3 continued
Taxes
Assets Paid
Taxpayer B-1 and Spouse (000 Omitted)
At time of death 
Marital
$5,712
(2,856) $2,856 None
Federal gross estate tax
2,856
1,155
2,856
1,155 $2,310
1,701 $1,701 $2,310
1,701
Assets transferred $3,402
Assets transferred versus 
taxes paid 60% 40%
through transferring one-half of his property to his spouse, of the 
maximum marital deduction.
In Exhibit 3, the total taxes paid by A-1 and spouse (the tax­
payers who recognized gains and paid the capital gains tax) now
EXHIBIT 4
Assets
Taxes
Paid
Taxpayer A-2 and Spouse (000 Omitted)
At time of death 
Marital
$ 8,874 
( 4,437) $4,437
$1,522
Federal gross estate tax
4,437
2,076
4,437
2,076 4,152
2,361 $2,361 $5,674
2,361
Assets transferred $ 4,722
Assets transferred versus 
taxes paid 45% 55%
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Taxpayer B-2 and Spouse
Taxes 
Paid
EXHIBIT 4 continued
Assets
(000 Omitted)
At time of death 
Marital
$11,424 
( 5,712) $5,712
None
Federal gross estate tax
5,712
2,905
5,712
2,905 $5,810
2,807 $2,807 $5,810
2,807
Assets transferred $ 5,614
Assets transferred versus 
taxes paid 49% 51%
exceeds by a minor amount ($2,422,000 versus $2,310,000) the 
estate taxes paid by B-1 and spouse. However, in Exhibit 4, the 
estate taxes paid by B-2 and spouse continue to exceed 
($5,810,000 versus $5,674,000) the combination of capital gains 
and estate taxes paid by A-2 and spouse.
The AICPA believes that Professor Surrey was erroneous in  
these remarks concerning the present system during the Hess 
Lecture:
This com plete forgiveness is totally unfair to people who have 
built up their estate from after-tax income, whether it derives 
from dividends, salary or capital gains upon which tax has al­
ready been paid. It is a com plete windfall to those who are 
building up their estates out of before-tax income, the untaxed  
appreciation in value. (p. 49; emphasis added)
Certainly the terms “complete forgiveness,” “complete wind­
fall,” and “untaxed appreciation” are grossly deceptive and do 
not properly describe the tax situations of the hypothetical tax­
payers B-1 and B-2 in the above illustrations.
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Position of Another Professional Group—
American Bankers Association
In its commentary on the 1969 Treasury Proposals, the ABA 
contends that the capital gain tax on appreciation at death is re­
gressive and unfair. Large estates would have the lowest net rate 
of capital gain tax since the tax would be allowed as a deduction 
at the highest transfer tax bracket. At present rates, 77 percent 
of the capital gain tax could be recouped from the estate tax. 
Whatever progressive rate scale is adopted, the capital gain tax 
must bite more deeply into estates in the lower brackets.
Undue complexity is another charge levelled against the Trea­
sury Proposals by the ABA. Complications stem from the exclu­
sion from the capital gain tax of property qualifying for the mari­
tal, charitable, and orphans deductions. Such exclusions would 
make the basis of any particular asset unknown until all assets are 
finally allocated among the beneficiaries, and sales of assets and 
funding of bequests of pecuniary amounts would have long un­
certain tax consequences.
The ABA further points out that the 1969 Treasury Proposals 
contain a specter of interdependent tax computations with multi­
ple variables. The amount of the marital and charitable deduc­
tions depends on the capital gain tax; that tax is dependent on 
the amount of property qualifying for the deductions; and the 
estate tax depends on, and often is interwoven with, the equation 
in fractional share deduction computations.
The brusque discarding by the 1969 Treasury Proposals of the 
present deferred tax treatment of “income in respect of a dece­
dent” in IRC Sec. 691 is challenged by the ABA. The Treasury 
Department proposed to bunch all “income in respect of a dece­
dent,” whenever it is to be received, in the final return of the de­
cedent, leaving the amelioration of the tax consequences to the 
income-averaging provisions. The ABA points out that the pro­
posal complicates rather than simplifies the taxation of such in­
come. Generally, “income in respect of a decedent” is not readily 
marketable and not readily subject to accurate valuation. There­
fore, it will necessarily be reported at values below the full 
amounts to be collected. The discount would be reported over 
the same period, in the same fashion, and by the same taxpayers
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as under current law. Moreover, anticipatory taxation would cre­
ate serious liquidity problems for the estate.
The ABA further points out that taxpayers with identical 
amounts of losses would be treated differently, depending upon 
the existence of gains and losses in the year of death and in the 
three prior years. Furthermore, while losses would be allowed on 
lifetime gifts, they would be disallowed on transfers to related 
parties. The ABA rhetorically asks, “To whom does one ordinar­
ily make lifetime gifts, if not to related parties?”
In other areas of criticism, the ABA takes issue with the Trea­
sury Department’s proposed allowance of basis at the higher of 
actual basis or enactment date value, with the minimum basis, 
with the absence of an exemption for life insurance, and with the 
triggering of added taxes where the decedent’s state of residence 
conforms its income taxes to those of the federal government. The 
ABA shies away from the obligation to prove cost basis, asserting 
that many taxpayers maintain inadequate records, in reliance 
upon the stepped-up bases rules under the current estate tax law.
The ABA originally advocated carryover of basis as its alter­
native to the present system. It reconsidered, and now is in favor 
of the Additional Estate Tax (A ET ). Under the carryover of 
basis concept, the transferor’s tax basis for all properties included 
in the decedent’s estate would carry over to the transferee, as is 
the case at present when property is transferred by inter vivos 
gift. The federal estate tax before state death tax credit would be 
added to the bases of assets transferred, but limited to the extent 
that the fair market value of the estate’s assets exceed their bases. 
Tangible property held for personal use by the decedent would 
be allowed a step-up of basis within the limits of $5,000 per item 
and $25,000 in total.
The carryover-of-basis proposal was attractive for the follow­
ing reasons:
• It has proved to be operative under present gift tax rules;
• The tax burden would fall on the parties who realize income 
on a voluntary sale of the property, and at a time when funds be­
come available to pay the tax;
• Death is not the moment of realization of income;
• Carryover of basis meets the objection to the escape from in­
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come tax of appreciation on a decedent’s assets;
• The inequity of imposition of tax before realization of income 
cannot be eliminated by averaging devices; and
• Relief measures for deferring the tax will not be necessary un­
der the carryover-of-basis concept.
Yet in its commentary on the carryover-of-basis proposal, the 
ABA presented its reconsideration of the matter.
The ABA is deeply concerned with proposals that would re­
quire the establishment of historical cost basis for federal income 
tax purposes after property passes through an estate. It contends 
in its commentary, that many people have not maintained ade­
quate records in reliance on current law which makes cost basis 
irrelevant when the property owner dies.
The carryover-of-basis proposal also allows the addition of fed­
eral estate taxes to the bases of items of property. The ABA is 
concerned that sales of property by the executor of an estate 
prior to the final determination of the estate tax liability will in­
volve guesswork as to the income tax consequences of such sales 
and will necessitate the filing of amended fiduciary and benefi­
ciary income tax returns as a matter of burdensome routine. Fur­
ther, with carryover of basis the period over which taxpayers 
tend to refrain from the sale of property to postpone the inci­
dence of taxation would be indefinitely extended, thus creating a 
lock-in problem.
The ABA also considers it manifestly unfair for estate taxes to 
be allocated under the carryover-of-basis proposal to property 
qualifying for the marital or charitable deductions. Yet, if certain 
property is to receive a basis adjustment, and other property is 
not, the entire process of administration would be beset by the 
indefiniteness of the bases of specific items.
Sales soon after the date of death are often obligatory to pay 
death taxes, debts, expenses, and bequests. Under the carryover- 
of-basis proposal, the ABA concluded, these sales may result in 
substantial capital gains, and the need to pay taxes thereon may 
require further sales which in turn may add to additional cap­
ital gain taxes—a compound “mushroom ” effect. In light of this 
interaction, the ABA contends that the carryover-of-basis proposal
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bears a close resemblance to the capital gains tax-at-death pro­
posal—without the advantages of the latter (that is, the capital 
gains tax liability would reduce the estate tax).
The ABA believes that a carryover-of-basis rule would bring 
with it the practical elimination of the utilitarian pecuniary mar­
ital bequest. Draftsmen would be wary because the funding of 
such bequests might involve recognition of prohibitive amounts 
of capital gain.
Finally, if a carryover-of-basis rule is enacted, the ABA envi­
sions firm resistance by Congress to meaningful transfer tax re­
ductions. The ABA believes that the tax revenues eventually to 
be derived from adoption of a carryover-of-basis rule cannot be 
accurately measured.
While the ABA favors retention of the current taxing system, it 
urges only as the least problem-filled alternative the adoption of 
the “Additional Estate Tax” (A ET ). The ABA devised the AET 
as an alternative to the capital gains tax after deciding to reject 
support for the carryover-of-basis concept which it had previous­
ly favored.
The AET would be imposed at the fixed rate of 14 percent on 
net appreciation of assets upon death and upon transfers made 
within the two years preceding death. Property transferred earli­
er would take a carryover basis as under current law. The 14 per­
cent rate was arrived at by multiplying the complement of a 
postulated highest transfer tax bracket (60 percent) by the high­
est capital gains tax rate (35 percent). The tax would apply even 
upon property qualifying for the marital and charitable deduc­
tions.
Losses at death would not be rebated to any extent by the 
AET. The ABA considers their proposed reduced rate structure 
a sufficient compensation for estates holding depreciated assets. 
Only appreciation after the enactment of the AET would be sub­
ject to the tax. Accordingly, the proposed rate reductions of the 
transfer tax to a ceiling of 60 percent would be phased in over a 
five-year period as the revenues generated by the AET would 
presumably increase.
The AET is advocated by the ABA in lieu of the Treasury Pro­
posals on three broad grounds: (1) it would be progressive, and 
therefore fair; (2) it would be simple because it would avoid
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complex refinements, and would be collected along with the basic 
transfer tax; and (3) it would be constitutional because it would 
be an excise tax, a classification which might not apply to the 
capital gains tax. Each of these claimed attributes of the AET is 
evaluated below.
AICPA Proposals
Retention o f Current Law. After carefully studying each of 
the proposals for taxing, directly or indirectly, the unrealized ap­
preciation of assets at death, the AICPA concluded that the ob­
jectionable features of each proposal were compelling and beyond 
recasting. It has further concluded that the AICPA should not 
temper its strong belief that the current law should not be 
abandoned, or by expressing a qualified preference for one pro­
posed change over the others. The following discussion serves to 
support the AICPA’s conclusions.
The a b a ’s proposed tax is called an “Additional Estate Tax,” 
but it is not that; it is an income tax. It is measured by gains— 
unrealized gains—and that is its fundamental defect. The AICPA, 
as a general observation, takes the position that the claimed ad­
vantages of the AET are not valid. It does not agree that the tax 
is fair, progressive, simple, and constitutional beyond debate.
T he Correlation o f D eath and Gain. The focal point of the 
problem with both the AET and the 1969 Treasury Proposals is 
their turn from the heretofore well-established principle that 
taxes on appreciation should be imposed only when gains are 
realized and when cash to pay the taxes is generated. The AICPA 
believes that the view of death as a moment of realization of gain 
is philosophically unsound. Paper profits at any point in time 
are so ephemeral that, if they are to be taxed, only an immense­
ly complex system involving alternate valuation dates, liberal tax 
deferrals, credits, averaging, and quick-refund procedures could 
possibly provide for fairness.
D ouble Tax. The AET would be in effect a double tax. This 
is acknowledged by the ABA. No deduction would be allowed 
for the basic estate tax for AET purposes. The resultant double 
tax is embraced by the ABA so that the AET would be progres­
sive, when viewed in combination with the basic estate tax.
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Rate o f Tax. The AET would not be on a graduated scale, 
yet it is labeled “progressive” by the ABA. It is not convincing 
to contend that the AET is progressive when (but only when) it 
is combined with the basic estate tax rate schedule. It is obvious 
that a taxpayer who has accumulated a modest amount of tax­
able appreciation over many years would be taxed at the same 
rate as one who has accumulated substantial appreciation over 
a short-term period. By contrast, the income tax rules do ease the 
burden upon lower-bracket taxpayers. In addition, the inclusion 
of only one-half of net long-term gain in taxable income, the ex­
emption from the minimum tax, and the income averaging pro­
visions operate in favor of the individual who recognizes relative­
ly small amounts of gain on an annual basis.
The AET rate would be tied directly to the highest capital 
gain tax rates. There have been many proposals to increase or 
otherwise modify the capital gains tax. If the tax is increased, as 
it has been in recent years, it has been assumed that an increase 
in the rate of the AET would follow. Such a change would mag­
nify the problems associated with the AET, not the least of which 
would be the liquidity crisis in prospect for estates.
Basis Problems. The ABA is concerned with the requirement, 
especially under the carryover-of-basis proposal, to prove actual 
cost basis. The AICPA does not share that concern—at least not 
to an extent that would justify so complicating the estate tax 
structure. The current recordkeeping requirements should be 
observed by all taxpayers; and no taxpayer should be entitled to 
ignore these requirements based on the highly speculative as­
sumption that he will hold his property until his death.
The a b a ’s concern with proof of basis, however, does not ex­
tend to several areas in which carryover of basis is adopted un­
der the AET. For example, there is apparently no concern with 
the present gift tax basis rules. Nevertheless, to avoid proof of 
basis it proposes to adopt a start-up date rule. The AICPA sees 
a serious problem in the choice of fair market value on the en­
actment date as the basis of property for AET purposes.
The enactment date rule would create a nationwide appraisal 
obligation which would be a substantial administrative burden. 
Estates are not necessarily made up primarily of listed securities, 
and the valuation problems at the time of death could be enor­
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mous. Disputes between examining agents and taxpayers’ repre­
sentatives often involve the valuation of real estate, partnership 
interests, closely held corporations, loans receivable, copyrights 
and patents, valuable art work, large blocks of securities, and 
present and future interests in trusts. These disputes often reach 
the courts. A start-up date would bring another set of subjective 
valuations into the transfer tax picture, and the AICPA believes 
that the accompanying distortions and inaccuracies would be an 
unfortunate consequence of this approach. Moreover, the devel­
opment of self-serving records to support valuations for the types 
of assets listed above could become a widespread practice. The 
prospects of an informed and fair review of the accuracy of these 
records would likely be inversely proportional to the interval be­
tween their preparation and review.
If a start-up date is adopted, enormous numbers of persons 
will be obliged to price an inconceivably large number of assets. 
Relatively few estates now must file federal estate tax returns be­
cause of the exemption under current law. Consequently, the as­
sets of relatively few estates undergo professional appraisal. But 
it is difficult—if not impossible—for a taxpayer to know that he 
will not have a taxable estate in the uncertain future. He, there­
fore, cannot safely assume that he need not determine his start­
up date values. Under these conditions, the appraisal of property 
as of the start-up date would be an immediate major burden, and 
valuation controversies in the settlement of estate tax liabilities 
would be many times more frequent than is presently the case.
Marital and Charitable Deductions. The AET makes no al­
lowance for transfers that qualify for the marital and charitable 
deductions. In connection with the 100 percent marital deduction 
proposal, the 1969 Treasury Proposals appropriately state:
It does not appear, then, that transfer of property between hus­
band and wife are appropriate occasions for imposing tax. An 
especially difficult burden may be imposed by the tax when 
property passes to a widow, particularly if there are minor chil­
dren. The present system of taxing transfers between spouses 
does not accord with common understanding of most husbands 
and wives that the property they have accumulated is ‘ours.’ (p. 
358)
34
This view should be compared with the ABA’s view that “as 
a matter of theory, imposition of a tax on appreciation should not 
turn upon the destination or use of the appreciation.” As a matter 
of practice and public policy, the marital deduction has been al­
lowed in valid recognition of the nature of the marital relation­
ship and to equate the tax consequences of taxpayers living in 
jurisdictions having diff erent property law concepts. Moreover, 
deductions for income tax purposes generally have been allowed 
for the value of assets transferred to charity, and no gain need 
be reported if the transferred assets have appreciated.
The a b a ’s overriding consideration in suggesting these tax 
provisions is revealed in the following statement.
Further, if exemptions from the A E T  based upon the recipients 
of the property subjected to the tax or adjustments to it are in­
troduced, simplicity is lost, and administration becomes complex.
It is time that simplicity and ease of administration, whether it 
works ‘for or ‘against’ the taxpayer, be considered as priority ob­
jectives in the enactment of tax laws. ( pp. 2-43, 44, emphasis sup­
plied )
If we substitute for the words “for” and “against" in the fore­
going quotation the words “equitably” and “inequitably”—or 
“fairly” and “unfairly”—the consequence of the selection of sim­
plicity as the overriding priority may be more clearly apparent.
Simplicity and Unfairness—The Correlatives. Although the 
AET conceivably could be modified to achieve greater equity, the 
ABA apparently prefers not to do this on the grounds of an over­
riding need for simplicity. The following observations seem ap­
propriate in this connection.
• Appreciation would be taxed, but there would be no tax rebate 
for a net loss at death. The investor may have paid capital gains 
taxes throughout his life, but no carryback of a net loss position 
would be available, and no transfer tax reduction is suggested. 
The ABA suggests that the investor would have some relief with 
its proposed lower tax rate schedule. The AICPA believes that in 
an effort to simplify this proposal, the fundamental income tax
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character of the AET is ignored, and thus the normal income tax 
equitable safeguards are omitted.
• The AET is at a flat rate. A graduated rate, providing lower 
rates for insubstantial amounts of appreciation, is rejected—in the 
interest of simplicity.
• Properties qualifying for the marital and charitable deductions 
are subjected to the AET—in the interest of simplicity.
• The AET proposal incorporates a mandatory start-up date basis 
rule, although the ABA recognizes that inequities would occur 
between and among individuals, that there would be advantages 
for taxpayers holding highly appreciated property at the enact­
ment date, and that there would be hardship for taxpayers who 
have a provable basis for property greater than its value on that 
date—in the interest of simplicity.
• Tangible personal property generally is exempted from the 
AET; neither gain nor loss would be considered; and no dollar 
ceiling would be imposed upon the exemption, even though in­
equities could result—in the interest of simplicity.
Constitutionality. The ABA states that the capital gain tax 
on net unrealized appreciation at death has been attacked as 
unconstitutional. It further asserts: “Any problem in this regard is 
avoided by the AET, which is an excise tax as contrasted to an 
income tax.” Regarding the nature of its proposed tax, the ABA 
admits, “Some people will say that the AET is nothing more than 
a capital gains tax at death. They are obviously correct in the 
sense that the result is the sam e—th e  taxation of net unrealized 
appreciation at death.” In view of the foregoing, a layman might 
wonder why an AET at death should be considered any more or 
less constitutional than a capital gain tax at death. Would not the 
courts, in evaluating the constitutionality of the AET, look hard 
at the acknowledged similarity of the result, and not be unduly 
swayed by the label “excise tax”?
Summary
The proposals that would purportedly prevent any tax reduc­
tion opportunities under the current system are melanges of com­
plexities and inequities bound to cause extreme difficulties for 
taxpayers and government alike. If there is merit to the positions
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of both the 1969 Treasury Proposals and the ABA that proof of 
actual basis over the years would be a hardship, then carryover 
of basis is impractical and, as a matter of equity, we should then 
resort to a new start-up basis under any new taxing proposal. If, 
however, there is—as the AICPA contends—a host of inherent in­
equities in the new start-up basis, then it should be rejected. It 
is believed also that the notion that the occasion of death is an 
appropriate time for the recognition of unrealized gain is un­
sound and that it should not be acceptable to Congress.
The asserted imperatives for a change of current law are not 
absolutely compelling. It is at least debatable that a shift of 
problems from one tax system (for example, the income tax sys­
tem) to another (for example, the estate tax system) is progress. 
Estates which pay as much tax as did our illustrative taxpayers 
B-1 and B-2 on pages 23—27 do not escape the taxing system. 
Furthermore, there should be no extensive opportunities for 
transfer tax avoidance if the AICPA’s other recommendations— 
a unified transfer tax; restrictions on generation skipping; and re­
jection of an increased marital deduction—are adopted. The pres­
ent rules do not confuse the separate roles of the income and es­
tate taxes. The estate tax complements the income tax. The estate 
tax is equitably progressive; at least, it has such high rates that 
Congress should continue to permit the beneficiaries to take bases 
equal to the full values subject to such heavy tax assessments.
The AICPA knows and experienced practitioners will attest 
that the present system is workable. The ease of reference to 
finally determined estate tax values to prove the bases of assets 
subsequently sold is manifest. If simplicity of administration of 
the tax law has merit, as is so often asserted by members of Con­
gress and professional groups, the AICPA believes that where 
the law has this attribute with respect to taxation at death, it 
should not be discarded.
A practical and equitable exchange of a tax on appreciation 
cannot be made for an appreciable rate reduction. A new start-up 
date necessitates a phase-in of any rate reduction, as is apparent 
in the AET proposal. The new start-up date also requires specula­
tion as to the amount of tax which would be derived from ap­
preciation over the years ahead as shown by the previous discus­
sion of the ups and downs of the securities markets. Congress 
would have to gamble that appreciation during that period would
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be enough to permit a considerably lower top tax bracket. More­
over, whatever the rate concessions might be, these intended 
benefits might be more than counterbalanced by the new pro­
posed tax system to which estates would be subject. Reasonable 
opportunities for rate reduction exist in the AICPA’s several 
other recommendations.
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5Unified Transfer Tax
Background
Current law imposes an estate tax on certain transfers at death 
and a gift tax on certain transfers during life. Each tax has a 
separate rate schedule with the gift tax rates representing three- 
quarters of the estate tax rates at comparable levels. The estate 
tax exemption is $60,000 while the gift tax has a lifetime exemp­
tion of $30,000 for each donor and an annual exclusion of $3,000 
for gifts of present interests to each of any number of donees. 
The gift tax is imposed on the value of the gift but the gift tax 
itself is not treated as an additional transfer subject to tax. Under 
the estate tax law, the tax itself is subjected to tax because the 
estate tax is imposed on the gross estate reduced only by deduc­
tions and not by the estate tax.
Statistics repeatedly issued by the Treasury indicate that de­
spite the substantial tax incentives for lifetime giving, only a 
small percentage of individuals for whom estate tax returns are 
filed make such gifts in amounts exceeding the lifetime gift ex­
emption and the annual gift tax exclusions.
Discussion
The primary policy question involved in determining whether 
there should be a single rate structure applicable to lifetime 
transfers and to transfers at death is the extent to which lifetime 
giving should be encouraged. The general consensus appears to 
be that such giving should be encouraged because it is socially 
desirable to have property transferred to or for the benefit of
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younger generations where there is usually a greater need and a 
greater willingness to make the property productive. Thus, the 
issue becomes whether the present dual rate structure strikes a 
proper balance between creating incentives for lifetime giving 
and being fair to different taxpayers.
The 1969 Treasury Proposals take the position that current 
law grants an undue preference to lifetime gifts because it bene­
fits the relatively wealthy individual who can afford to make sig­
nificant lifetime gifts compared to the less well-to-do individual 
who cannot afford to do so.
Position of Other Professional Groups
The ABA favors a single rate structure for all transfers, wheth­
er made during life or at death. The ABA’s acceptance of a sin­
gle rate structure is subject to the qualification that the rates will 
be lowered to offset the additional transfer taxes that will be pay­
able at death by persons who make taxable transfers during life.
“Grossing up” the amount of lifetime gifts to be included in a 
single rate structure for all transfers has also been proposed. This 
concept has been explained to require that the single-rate-sched­
ule transfer tax would be imposed upon the fair market value of 
the property transferred, including, in the case of lifetime trans­
fers, the amount of the federal transfer tax incurred on the trans­
fer, which is an integral part of the making of the gift. Under 
present law, the tax on lifetime gifts is based on the fair market 
value of the property transferred exclusive of any gift tax. In the 
case of testamentary transfers, however, the present estate tax is 
imposed on the full value of the property in the estate, including 
that portion used to pay the estate tax imposed. Under the uni­
fied transfer tax, this difference in treatment between lifetime 
gifts and testamentary transfers would be eliminated by grossing 
up the fair market value of lifetime gifts, thus causing the trans­
fer tax in effect, to be paid out of the property taxed, as is the 
case with testamentary transfers. A table would be provided 
showing the amount of the grossed-up transfer so that taxpayers 
would not be burdened with complex calculations.
The ABA opposes the use of grossing up for all lifetime 
transfers on two grounds. First, it discourages lifetime gifts be­
cause the payment of the additional transfer tax imposed on the
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tax results in the loss of subsequent earnings on that amount 
during the remaining life of the transferor. Second, it is compli­
cated and would not be understood by transferors, particularly 
when, as is possible, the tax is greater than the amount of the 
gift itself.
A majority of the members comprising various bodies within 
the ALI appear to prefer a unified transfer tax. In October 1967, 
however, the Council of the ALI voted 12 to 11 in favor of the 
retention of the dual tax system.
At the present time, there appears to be no official ALI recom­
mendation on the choice between a dual tax system and a uni­
fied tax system. The ALI does appear to favor grossing up all 
lifetime transfers and the retention of the present $3,000 annual 
gift tax exclusions.
AICPA Proposals
Since lifetime transfers should continue to be encouraged and 
further, since the current incidence of taxation on testamentary 
dispositions is imposed disproportionately and unfairly on low 
and medium-sized estates, the AICPA proposes a modified uni­
fied transfer tax as follows.
Retention o f Current Estate Tax Rates. The modified unified 
transfer tax would utilize the federal estate tax rates as currently 
established by IRC Sec. 2001. Along with this, the AICPA ad­
vocates continuation of the current incentive to make inter vivos 
gifts by subjecting such gifts to a tax at the rate of 75 percent 
of that rate.
Inclusion o f L ifetim e Gifts. Lifetime gifts would be included 
in the unified rate without grossing up lifetime dispositions ex­
cept for gifts in contemplation of death. The 75 percent rate 
would be preserved at death by the inclusion of only 75 percent 
of the taxable value of property transferred during lifetime and 
by the granting of credit against the unified transfer tax liability 
for gift taxes paid on such taxable gifts. Gifts in contemplation 
of death, as that term is currently defined by Sec. 2035, would be 
grossed up so that both the value of the property at the date
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of death and the amount of gift tax paid would be subject to the 
unified transfer tax at death. Credit would be granted against the 
unified transfer tax liability for gift taxes paid on gifts made in 
contemplation of death.
Annual Exclusion for Gifts. The AICPA advocates the con­
tinuation of the $3,000 annual exclusion for gifts of present in­
terests in property as currently provided by Sec. 2 5 0 3 (b ).
Unified Transfer Tax Deduction. For the current estate tax ex­
emption in the amount of $60,000, provided by Sec. 2052, and 
the current specific gift tax exemption in the amount of $30,000, 
provided by Sec. 2521, the AICPA would substitute a unified 
transfer tax deduction in the amount of $150,000, available, at 
the option of the taxpayer, either against inter vivos gift tax 
liabilities or against the unified transfer tax imposed at death.
Retention o f Marital Deduction. The AICPA proposes the re­
tention of the allowance of a marital deduction as currently pro­
vided by Sec. 2056.
Summary
The AICPA believes that the recommendations outlined above 
will continue to encourage lifetime gifts. The continuation of the 
75 percent gift tax rates, the availability of annual gift tax exclu­
sions, the continuing possibility of removing asset appreciation 
from an estate by eliminating from the death transfer tax appre­
ciation from the date of the gift to the date of death, and the 
income tax considerations often associated with inter vivos trans­
fers can all be cited as continuing reasons to support inter vivos 
gift transfers.
The current estate exemption of $60,000 and the current spe­
cific gift tax exemption of $30,000 are inadequate when con­
sidered in light of many years’ inflation. Accordingly, the AICPA 
recommends that the current tax exemptions be replaced by a uni­
fied transfer tax deduction of $150,000, available to a taxpayer to 
reduce either the amounts of inter vivos taxable gifts or to reduce 
the taxable estate. Also recommended is the continuation of the
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two present transfer tax schedules since the availability of two 
schedules does not create undue administrative problems.
The “gross-up” concept for inter vivos transfers is opposed pri­
marily because such a provision would discourage lifetime gifts. 
The gross-up concept also appears to be extremely complex in 
administration.
Exhibits 5, 6 and 7 (p. 44-47) respectively illustrate the 
AICPA recommendations to retain the current rates, to retain 
the current concept of a marital deduction, and to substitute 
a unified transfer tax deduction in the amount of $150,000 for 
the current $60,000 and $30,000 estate and gift tax exemp­
tions. (Each schedule illustrates four hypothetical estate valua­
tions.) The AICPA believes that these recommendations, when 
combined with its other recommendations, including our recom­
mendation for severe restrictions on generation skipping, will not 
adversely affect the total federal revenues derived from these 
sources. Instead, these recommendations should alleviate sub­
stantial inequities currently imposed on low and medium-sized 
estates. It is noteworthy in the following schedules that total 
transfer taxes from an estate with net disposable assets aggre­
gating $200,000 would be decreased from $36,100 to $7,000, 
while for larger estates, total transfer taxes would not be sig­
nificantly affected. Equally important should be the fact that in 
the typical situation where the male predeceases the female, no 
death transfer taxes would be payable at the death of the first 
decedent until net disposable assets exceed $300,000 where the 
surviving spouse inherits all of the family’s assets. Since the 
necessities of life often dictate that in low and medium-sized 
estates the surviving spouse requires all of the family’s assets, 
the AICPA proposed tax structure should permit and strongly 
encourage such testamentary  dispositions by imposing the major 
portion of death transfer tax liability only at the time of death 
of the second spouse.
Exhibit 7 (p. 46—47) illustrates the effect of inter vivos gifts 
(other than gifts in contemplation of death) by the first decedent. 
Note that substantial savings in total federal unified transfer 
taxes can be realized by the continued use of inter vivos gifts; 
such savings are increased where the unified transfer tax deduc­
tion of $150,000 is not claimed against earlier gifts taxed at low 
gift tax rates.
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Exhibit 8 (opposite) summarizes the computations in Exhibits 
5, 6, and 7.
Assume the following for these schedules:
1. Decedents with net disposal assets of $200,000 or less transfer 
their total estate to a surviving spouse. Such second estates are 
reduced only by federal estate taxes imposed at the first death.
2. Decedents with net disposable assets of $1,000,000 or more 
utilize a full marital deduction and limit testamentary disposi­
tions to a spouse to such amount.
3. Assets transferred at the death of the first decedent neither 
appreciate nor depreciate in value between the date of transfer 
and the date of death of the second spouse.
4. Credit for state death taxes are disregarded for the purposes 
of these computations since they effectively represent a substitu­
tion for such death taxes.
5. Annual exclusions are disregarded in determining inter vivos 
gifts in Exhibit 7.
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6Liberalization of Deferred Payment of 
Federal Estate Tax
Background
Section 6166 was enacted by Congress in 1958, The House com­
mittee report accompanying HR 8381, which added Sec. 6166 to 
the 1954 code, provided that where the value of an interest in a 
closely held business represents a significant portion of the base 
on which the federal estate tax is computed, the federal death 
tax can be paid in ten annual installments instead of a lump-sum 
payment fifteen months after the death of the decedent.
For purposes of IRC Sec. 6166 a closely held business includes 
a proprietorship, or stock or ownership interest in a partnership 
or corporation of 20 percent or more, or a partnership or corpora­
tion in which there are ten or fewer partners or shareholders.
The House committee report explained the purpose was to 
make it possible to keep together a business enterprise where the 
death of one of the larger owners of the business results in the 
imposition of a relatively heavy estate tax. Under existing law, 
when a decedent has a substantial portion of his estate invested 
in the business enterprise, the heirs might be confronted with the 
necessity of either breaking up the business or selling it to a larger 
enterprise in order to obtain funds to pay the federal estate tax. 
This is especially unfortunate in the case of small businesses, 
which traditionally are also closely held businesses. By spreading 
out the period over which the estate tax may be paid, it would be
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possible for the estate tax to be paid out of the earnings of the 
business, or at least it would provide the heirs with time to obtain 
funds with which to pay the tax without upsetting the operation 
of the business. This provision was believed to be particularly 
important in preventing corporate mergers and in maintaining 
the free enterprise system.
Section 6166 was deemed necessary because the general provi­
sion of Sec. 6161(a) (1 ) permitting a six-month extension of time 
for payment of federal taxes, including federal estate taxes by 
the IRS for reasonable cause, is not an adequate remedy for an 
executor holding an interest in a closely held business. Section 
6161(a) (2) ,  which permits the IRS to grant an extension of time 
for up to ten years for payment of estate taxes upon a showing 
that payment of the entire estate tax would result in “undue 
hardship” to the estate, is also an inadequate relief procedure for 
an executor holding an interest in a closely held business. For de­
cedents dying after December 31, 1970, an extension of time un­
der Sec. 6161(a ) (1 )  can be granted for up to a year (for rea­
sonable cause). Section 6165 permits the IRS to require that a 
bond (for up to twice the amount of tax involved) be furnished 
where an extension of time for payment is granted. The regula­
tions permit the IRS to require such a bond when an extension is 
granted under Sec. 6161. The bond requirement has not been ap­
plied in connection with Sec. 6166 extensions.
Where applicable, Sec. 303 presently permits redemption of 
stock of closely held corporations, to the extent of the entire 
amount of estate taxes, administration expenses, and funeral ex­
penses. If there is a profit on the redemption ( that is, if the sales 
price exceeds the estate tax value), the profit is taxed as a capital 
gain.
Discussion
Reference to the amount of the estate taxes, federal and state, 
payable at death, indicates that the executor of the estate of a 
deceased owner of a closely held business interest is faced with 
a substantial liability for estate taxes. The growth of the value 
of such an interest during the lifetime of the owner, increases 
the potential estate tax burden. The greater the growth, the 
greater the likelihood that the executors will have to sell the
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closely held business interest. Inflation serves further to aggra­
vate this problem.
The following chart indicates the estate tax liability of a de­
cedent resident of New York State.
Estate
before
exemption
Federal
tax
New York 
tax Total
Percent on excess 
New
Federal York
$ 300,000 $ 59,100 $ 10,000 $ 69,100 26.8 5.0
500,000 116,500 20,000 136,500 28.0 6.0
700,000 176,700 32,000 208,700 30.2 7.0
1,060,000 289,140 58,800 347,940 33.4 8.0
2,060,000 649,280 153,000 802,280 41.8 10.0
3,060,000 1,075,920 267,200 1,343,120 47.2 12.0
4,060,000 1,551,560 401,400 1,952,960 52.6 14.0
5,060,000 2,069,880 551,000 2,620,880 55.8 15.0
6,060,000 2,620,200 710,600 3,330,800 58.0 16.0
The owner of a substantial equity in a closely held business
needs statutory help, which would permit deferred payment of 
these substantial tax liabilities. The very size of the tax in rela­
tion to the estate should be enough “hardship” to permit relief 
without the necessity of proving “undue hardship” as presently 
required by See. 6161 ( a ) ( 2 ) .
The approach of Sec. 6166 in permitting an absolute right 
for installment payments over a ten-year period of federal estate 
tax attributable to taxation of a closely held business interest 
should be extended to provide relief in more instances.
Where there are several closely held business equities in an 
estate, the yardsticks of Sec. 303 and Sec. 6166 to treat them as 
one interest should be alike.
Position of Other Professional Groups
Section V III of the 1969 Treasury Proposals, “Estate and Gift 
Tax Proposals,” contained recommendations for liberalization of 
the Sec. 6166 payment rules. The proposals indicate that the 
“voting stock” requirement should be eliminated and that the 
shareholder limit should be raised from ten to fifteen. Further 
proposed liberalization would include permitting the installment- 
payment election (Sec. 6166) where the interest in the closely
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held business exceeds 25 percent of the taxable estate. The Trea­
sury Proposals would then limit the application of Sec. 303 to 
the portion of the estate tax which could qualify under Sec. 6166.
The ABA, in its “Summary of Transfer Act Draft Statute of the 
American Bankers Association” would permit deferral under Sec. 
6166 where the decedent’s interest in a closely held business ex­
ceeds 20 percent of his transfers at death. The definition of close­
ly held stock would include any stock not traded on a national 
securities exchange or in an over-the-counter market, or if so 
traded, if the estate includes 20 percent or more of the voting 
stock. In the case of partnerships, the required percentage of 
partnership interest would be reduced from twenty to ten, and 
the limitation on partners would be increased from ten to twenty.
AICPA Proposals
Section SOS Rules Regarding Treatm ent o f Several Closely H eld  
Business Equities as One Should Take on the Standards o f Sec. 
6166. Section 303 presently permits two or more corporations to 
be treated as a single corporation where an estate owns more than 
75 percent in value of the outstanding stock in each of the cor­
porations. Section 6166 has a similar provision, except that the 
ownership requirement is more than 50 percent of the stock. The 
AICPA recommends that this percentage test be the same for 
purposes of Secs. 303 and 6166, and that the 50 percent or more 
test of Sec. 6166 apply for purposes of Secs. 303 and 6166.
Period for  Sec. SOS Redem ption Should Recognize Litigation in 
Any Court. The period during which Sec. 303 may be utilized is 
the period of limitations for assessment of federal estate tax plus 
ninety days, or, if a petition for redetermination of an estate tax 
deficiency has been filed with the Tax Court, at any time before 
the expiration of sixty days after the decision of the Tax Court be­
comes final. The AICPA feels that there is no reason that taxpay­
ers who litigate in the District Court or Court of Claims should 
be prejudiced, and the AICPA recommends that the period dur­
ing which Sec. 303 may be applied be extended to the expiration 
of ninety days after the conclusion of litigation with regard to 
the estate tax liability.
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Elimination o f Voting Stock Requirem ent o f Sec. 6166 and the  
Raising o f the Shareholder Limit. These AICPA proposals are 
in agreement with those set forth by the Treasury Department.
Reductions in Percentage Ownership o f Stock Requirem ents in 
Secs. 303 and 6166. This is in agreement with the ABA’s pro­
posal. The AICPA favors these reductions in percentage owner­
ship of stock requirements to 20 percent (of transfers at death). 
It is also felt that Sec. 6166 should be as available to partners as it 
is to stockholders.
The purpose of Sec. 6166 is to provide additional time to pay 
estate taxes where the deceased's assets are not readily con­
vertible to cash because such assets consist of an interest in a 
closely held business. In these instances, an estate which includes 
a minority interest in a business may be less able to cause a re­
demption by the business of that interest than a holder of a large 
interest. Therefore, some holders are in great need of the benefit 
of Sec. 6166.
The problem with respect to liquidity of partnership interest 
is similar to that of the liquidity of a stockholder interest and 
should be subject to the same rules.
Retention o f Sec. 303(a). In opposition to the 1969 Treasury 
Proposals, the AICPA does not feel that Sec. 303 should be re­
stricted to the estate taxes attributable to the inclusion of a close­
ly held business in the gross estate. Section 303 is presently broad­
er in that it permits redemption of amounts representing all estate 
taxes as well as administrative expenses. The narrowing of Sec. 
303 would impose a serious liquidity hardship on estates which 
have to incur a substantial income tax liability in order to pay 
the estate taxes.
Elim inate “Undue” Requirem ent o f Hardship Situations. Sec­
tion 6161(a ) (2 )  should be revised to eliminate the word “undue” 
from the phrase “undue hardship.” The use of the word “undue” 
has in effect nullified the value of the provision because of the 
administrative problems of determining what hardship is “undue” 
hardship.
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Section 6166 Should Apply to Partners in a  Manner Similar to 
Stockholders. Section 6166 relief should be as available to part­
ners as to stockholders.
Elim inate Sec. 303's Extension Restriction to Tax Court Cases. 
A Sec. 303 redemption should be permitted after the conclusion 
of litigation in any court.
Summary
The AICPA believes that the tax laws should be made as con­
sistent as possible in similar provisions of related sections and in 
addition that they should not contain provisions which are ad­
ministratively impractical.
Differences among similar provisions, such as Secs. 6166 and 
303, presently cause confusion and inequities among taxpayers, 
and we feel our recommendations would result in greater fairness.
We believe that the recommendations contained in this section 
will bring about better results administratively and will be more 
acceptable to taxpayers in various situations.
Conclusion
The AICPA believes that the recommendations in this report 
provide a sound basis for federal estate and gift tax reform as far 
as the five areas reviewed are concerned. The AICPA feels that 
it has conformed the principles of fairness and simplicity to the 
extent that these two principles can be combined in this connec­
tion.
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